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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) came together with a set of rules for mem-
bership, known as the ”Maastricht criteria”, which stressed the need for convergence in the nominal
and real side of the economies of candidate countries. The presence of such rules signals the aver-
sion of political leaders to regional dispersions. There is some economic logic behind this concern.
For example, diﬀerentials in the level of public debt may generate political games where a virtuous
region has to bail out a less virtuous one to avoid the collapse of the union. Similarly, diﬀerential
in price dynamics may interfere with the price stability goal (see e.g. ECB (2003)). While casual
observation suggests that diﬀerentials in price dynamics are relatively small and die out quickly in
the US - a result recently challenged by Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2002) - the maximum inﬂa-
tion diﬀerential in the Euro area was above two percent for each of the last three years, inﬂation
diﬀerentials appear to be persistent and both the heterogeneity and the persistence are expected
to increase as the area is enlarged to new entrants (see e.g. Angeloni and Erhmann (2004)).
Should one worry about the existence and the persistence of such diﬀerentials? Diﬀerentials in
productivity may be one of the causes for regional price diﬀerential. As the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect
indicates, an increase in the productivity of the traded goods sector in one region, leads to higher
regional real wages. This in turn drives the regional relative price of non-traded goods up and, with
common prices for traded goods, the price level increases relative to the union average (see e.g.
Canzoneri, Valles and Vinals (1996)). When productivity diﬀerences are persistent, diﬀerentials in
output growth and inﬂation rates could be observed. Such diﬀerentials, however, do not necessarily
call for restraining actions by federal institutions (see e.g. Duarte and Wolman (2002)).
Demand factors, combined with a large component of non-tradables in the locally consumed
basket of goods, may be an alternative cause for regional price diﬀerentials. Persistent increases in
the demand for non-traded goods may generate localized bursts of inﬂation whenever the supply of
these goods is not perfectly elastic with respect to demand conditions. One component of demand
typically tilted towards non-traded and local goods is government expenditure. If local government
expenditure is an important source of price diﬀerentials and if price diﬀerentials pose a threat to
union wide inﬂation stability, Central Banks may want to closely monitor the dynamics of regional
ﬁscal variables (as suggested by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002)) and federal authorities may
be justiﬁed in imposing deﬁc i tl i m i t s( a st h eG r o w t ha n dS t a b i l i t yP a c ti nt h eE U )o rs t r i c tb a l a n c e
budget requirements (as the Graam, Rudman and Hollings amendment in the US).1I N T R O D U C T I O N 3
Diﬀerences in price dynamics are of particular concern in the EMU for two reasons. First,
since ﬁscal variables is controlled by national authorities, political economy type considerations
may induce them to use the ﬁscal trigger disregarding the union-wide consequences. As Perotti
(2002) suggested, many of the institutional provisions of the EMU can be rationalized in terms of
constraints on local ﬁscal policy to enable monetary policy to achieve its price stability mandate.
Second, the channels through which diﬀerential price dynamics are naturally dissipated are either
institutionally limited or absent. For example, goods markets are only weakly integrated and labor
mobility practically inexistent.
The existence of diﬀerentials price dynamics reached the forefront of the policy discussion re-
cently when Ireland received a reprimand by the EU council of Ministers in 2001 for running a
rather loose ﬁscal policy. In fact, in an attempt to attract foreign investment and to reduce budget
surpluses, the Irish government cut capital income taxes in 1999 and this was accompanied by large
output increases in 2000 and 2001 and a signiﬁcant inﬂation diﬀerential with the EU average.
This paper empirically studies the relationship between ﬁscal disturbances and regional price
diﬀerentials in monetary unions using a sample of 9 European countries and 47 US states. Given
the short life of the EMU area, the US experience provides valuable information on how price
diﬀerentials may evolve in response to unexpected variations in ﬁscal variables and useful insights
on the links between the dynamics of price diﬀerentials and the overall rate of inﬂation. Identifying
economically meaningful shocks is always a diﬃcult enterprise and ﬁscal disturbances are not an
exception. Endogeneity of ﬁscal variables, interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policy decisions,
delays between planning, approval and implementation of policies, and scarceness of reasonable zero
restrictions make ﬁscal disturbances diﬃcult to recover. We circumvent these problems using sign
restrictions on the dynamics of output and deﬁcits generated by a large class of DSGE models (see
e.g. Baxter and King (1993), Ludvigson (1996), Ohanian (1997), Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Pappa
(2004)). Mountford and Uhlig (2002) provide an earlier study where sign restrictions are used to
identify ﬁscal shocks in aggregate US data. We diﬀer in the implementation of the restrictions, in
the speciﬁcation of the VAR and in the estimators we consider. Since sign restrictions are routinely
used to check the reasonableness of identiﬁcation results, it makes sense to impose them directly
when extracting the informational content of a reduced form shock.
We identify two types of expenditure shocks: those ﬁnanced by bond creation, which produce
positive comovements in regional expenditure, output and deﬁcits; and those ﬁnanced by distorting
taxation, which leave deﬁcits unchanged and produce negative comovements between expenditure1I N T R O D U C T I O N 4
and output. For revenue shocks, on the other hand, we concentrate on textbook type shocks, i.e.
tax cuts which increase deﬁcits and output.
Given the panel nature of the data, our exercises are concerned in characterizing both average
tendencies and in highlighting cross sectional diﬀerences. Since the data is short in both T (time)
and N (units) and the model dynamic, standard techniques are unsuited for the analysis. The
approach we take is Bayesian: we model the cross section of experiments as repeated observations
on the same unknown phenomena (the response of regional price diﬀerentials to ﬁscal shocks). We
assume that the structural parameters for each unit are drawn from a common prior distribution
and we construct posterior distributions which reﬂect our a-priori assumptions and the information
contained in the data.
Our results suggest that, on average, deﬁcit ﬁnanced expansionary ﬁscal disturbances increase
price diﬀerentials, while expansionary ﬁscal shocks ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation decrease
them. Typically, diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments have diﬀerent quantitative eﬀects. For example in the
US, balance budget shocks produce the largest price diﬀerentials responses while the most persistent
dynamics are produced by expenditure shocks. Also, the timing of the peak response depends on
t h et y p eo fs h o c k s .O v e r a l l ,ﬁscal disturbances account for a modest and but nonnegligible portion
of price diﬀerential variability in both unions (on average, between 14-23 percent).
Several heterogeneities are present at the individual level. For example, in a third of the units
expansionary expenditure shocks signiﬁcantly decrease price diﬀerentials and in one fourth expan-
sionary revenue disturbances signiﬁcantly decrease price diﬀerentials. In some cases responses are
small and turn positive after one period but in others they are large and, at times, persistent. Puz-
zling as it might sound, this outcome is consistently reported in analyses conducted with aggregate
US data (see e.g. Fatas and Mihov (2001), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) or Mountford and
Uhlig (2002)) and in some OECD countries (see Perotti (2002)). We ﬁnd that intuitive explana-
tions based on geographical, political, economic and social considerations can not account for these
responses. We investigate two alternative potential explanations. One has to do with geographical
spillovers: if either the state is large in size or public (and private) expenditure is tilted toward
non-locally produced goods, increases in local demand may also aﬀect prices in neighboring states.
If these spillovers matter for union-wide prices, price diﬀerentials may decline following expansion-
ary ﬁscal shocks. The second explanation focuses on aggregate supply movements. If expansionary
ﬁscal shocks exercise an eﬀect on the labor or capital supply of the local economy (as, for example,
predicted by RBC-type models), it is possible for temporary output expansions to coexist with2 THE REDUCED FORM MODEL 5
temporary price diﬀerential declines. For the case of revenue shocks, the nature of taxation may
also explain the sign and the magnitude of price diﬀerential responses. For example, indirect tax
shocks could have substantially diﬀerent labor supply eﬀect than direct labor income or capital tax
shocks. Overall, both types of eﬀects are present in the data and partially explain the puzzling
price diﬀerential responses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the reduced form
model. Section 3 details the identiﬁcation restrictions used. Section 4 discusses the econometric
procedure. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
2T h e r e d u c e d f o r m m o d e l
The data available for both monetary unions is short: we have annual data from 1969 to 1995
for US states and quarterly data from 1997:1 to 2003:3 for the EMU nations 1. The shortness
of the data prevents us not only to study issues connected with the transmission of shocks across
units but also to be able to analyze medium scale empirical models which simultaneously include
local, regional and union wide variables. Given these limitations we are forced to make a number
of choices. We initially neglect possible neighborhood eﬀects and model the VAR for each unit
using ﬁve endogenous variables, a few exogenous variables and a constant for both unions. The
endogenous variables are: the log of the local to the union wide price level; the log of the local
to the union wide real per-capita GDP; the log of the local to the union wide employment level;
the log of local real government revenues and the log of local real direct government expenditure,
both in per-capita terms and deﬂated by local prices. The exogenous variables we include are the
area-wide nominal interest rate, the level of oil prices and, for the US, the area-wide deﬁcit and
the local debt. Oil prices are used to capture aggregate area-wide supply eﬀects, while with the
nominal interest rate and the area wide deﬁcit we attempt to control for aggregate cyclical eﬀects
which are demand driven. Favero and Monacelli (2002) estimated ﬁscal policy rules and found
that debt is an important determinant of taxes and expenditures. We include local debt in the
speciﬁcation for US states but exclude it from the EMU models since only annual data, displaying
very little variations over the sample, is available. Similarly, we exclude the area-wide deﬁcit from
the EMU speciﬁcation since no federal ﬁscal authority exists. We use only the direct component of
1Given that the convergence process was already completed two years before the EMU started, we included 1997
and 1998 data to our sample, even though, strictly speaking they do not belong to the new regime. None of the
qualitative conclusions we present are altered by omitting these two years from the sample.3 THE IDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS 6
government expenditure since transfers display low frequency movements which could distort our
analysis. The sources and the deﬁnition of the data are described in appendix A.
While theory indicates that output, employment and deﬁcits are crucial to understand the
macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy (see e.g. McGrattan (1994), Duarte and Wollman (2002),
Pappa (2003)), in practice, it is not clear how to measure the relevant quantities. For this reason,
we also examined several variants where revenues and expenditures are measured in percentage
of local GDP; where local GDP per-capita and local employment are not scaled by union wide
averages and where the local variables are expressed in growth rates (but not per-capita terms).
Furthermore, we have substituted the implicit price deﬂator for CPI 2 and checked if there are
independent low frequency movements in local variables which may make the interpretation of the
results problematic. The results we present are qualitatively invariant to all of these changes.
To claim that the shocks we recover are economically meaningful a number of orthogonality
assumptions also need to be made. For example, it is possible that state government expenditure is
(positively) correlated with the expenditure of neighboring states or that is (negatively) correlated
with union wide expenditure. To examine whether this omission is important, we have run a model
where in place of state ﬁscal variables we use the residual of a preliminary regression of these
variables on either union wide variables or the variables of the region where the state (country) is
located. The results are unchanged suggesting that, if present, these correlations are small.
Finally, given the data limitations, we use only one lag for each variable. We checked for US
states whether the inclusion of a second lag made a diﬀerence: it didn’t. After a short speciﬁcation
search we settled on making exogenous variables enter only contemporaneously in the system.
3T h e i d e n t i ﬁcation restrictions
While structural VARs have been extensively used to study the transmission of monetary policy
shocks, considerably less work has been done to identify ﬁscal disturbances and to examine their
macroeconomic eﬀects. Relevant exceptions include Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichen-
baum and Fisher(1999), Fatas and Mihov (2001), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2002) and Perotti (2002).
This apparent lack of interest is due, in part, to the fact that ﬁscal policy is rarely unpredictable.
A ﬁscal change is usually subject to long discussions and political debates before it is implemented.
2Since Implicit Price Deﬂator data is available in US states only from 1986 we have reconstructed them backcasting
with predictive regressions on CPI data.3 THE IDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS 7
These delays make standard innovation accounting problematic: agents adjust their behavior to
the new conditions when the old regime still prevails; macrovariables start moving before the shock
occurs and no surprise is measurable at the time when the policy change actually takes place. This
”non-fundamentalness” problem plagues ﬁscal shocks more than other types of policy disturbances.
A second conceptual problem has to do with the fact that, even when the policy stance is unchanged,
expenditures and revenues move with the state of the economy. Hence, it is necessary to separate
variations due to exogenous policy shifts from those due to endogenous reactions to the business
cycle. Third, as suggested in the ﬁscal theory of the price level (see e.g. Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2001) for a survey), ﬁscal and monetary policy actions may be related. This was true in the
past in many EMU countries were monetary authorities residually satisﬁed the government budget
constraint. Whenever policy decisions are tightly linked, identifying ﬁscal shocks in isolation from
monetary disturbances may be misleading (see e.g. Neri (2002)).
Our set up is designed to avoid, in principle, all these problems. First, because we consider
monetary unions, we can take monetary policy as given when examining regional ﬁscal policy. We
do this by imposing the exogeneity of the economy wide interest rate in the model. Second, since
all VAR variables are endogenous we can control for the state of the local business cycle while the
state of the aggregate economy is automatically factored out by taking real variables in deviation
from union wide variables and introducing a number of additional area wide controls. This setup
allows for aggregate shocks to exercise diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent states; removes the need to
produce cyclically adjusted estimates of ﬁscal variables and allows better separation of predictable
and unpredictable movements in the observables. Third, since we precisely deﬁne the kind of ﬁscal
disturbances we are looking for and the timing of the responses of the endogenous variables is
largely unrestricted, the non-fundamentalness problem is also considerably eased.
In this paper, we seek expenditure shocks with the following characteristics:
• (G shocks) They must produce contemporaneous positive comovements in regional deﬁcit and
positive comovements in regional output.
• (BB shocks) They must leave contemporaneous regional deﬁcit unchanged and produce neg-
ative comovements in regional output.
The ﬁrst type of expenditure shocks is the one usually encountered in macroeconomic textbooks,
in dynamic RBC or sticky price models (see e.g. Baxter and King (1993) or Pappa (2004)). An
unexpected increase in government spending, ﬁnanced by bond creation, by deﬁnition increases3 THE IDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS 8
regional deﬁcit, stimulates aggregate demand and boosts output. In identifying this type of shocks
we are agnostic about the behavior of tax revenues: they are allowed to stay unchanged or move
together with expenditure as long as the correlation with the latter is not perfect. We are also
agnostic about the timing of output responses (they could be contemporaneous, lagged or leading
the shock). We do not attempt to distinguish between Keynesian and Neoclassical shocks (see
Pappa (2004) for such an exercise). Once shocks are identiﬁed, one can indirectly examine the
nature of expenditure disturbances using the magnitude of output multipliers.
The second type of shocks we consider are budget-balanced shocks: these disturbances produce
instantaneous positive comovements in revenues, leave regional deﬁcits unchanged and generate
negative comovements in regional output. These dynamics are standard in general equilibrium
models of ﬁscal policy. For example, Baxter and King (1993) and Ohanian (1997) showed that in a
RBC type model an increase in government spending, ﬁnanced through labor taxation, temporarily
decreases consumption and investment and has protracted negative output eﬀects. While the sign
of the output eﬀect is robust across models with diﬀerent microfundations, the magnitude of the
fall depends on the source of ﬁnancing (e.g. income taxes vs. sales taxes), on the elasticity of
labor and capital supply to distortionary taxes and on whether a balance budget is imposed on a
period-by-period basis or if some ﬂexibility is allowed. Since the timing of the output responses is
unrestricted, anticipatory eﬀects are not a-priori ruled out, as are not ruled out future increases in
distorting taxation of the type considered by, e.g., Dotsey (1994).
For revenue disturbances, we seek shocks with the following features:
• (T shocks) They produce contemporaneous negative comovements in regional deﬁcits and
negative comovements in regional output.
The revenue disturbance we concentrate on is again standard (see e.g. Fatas and Mihov (2001)).
An unexpected decrease in tax revenues increases local deﬁcits and stimulates output by reduc-
ing the tax burden on the local economy. Here government expenditure is NOT assumed to be
unchanged: in fact, it could negatively comove with output if government consumption partially
plays an automatic stabilizer role. What is crucial for identiﬁcation is that the comovements of
expenditure and taxes are low so that budget deﬁcit negatively comove with revenue disturbances.
Also for these shocks the timing of output responses is unrestricted 3.
3In a earlier version of the paper we have also searched for ”Reagan-Laﬀer” shocks. Whenever distortionary
taxation is high, a decrease in tax revenues (engineered via a decline in average or marginal tax rates) may stimulate3 THE IDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS 9
We summarize the identifying restrictions in table 1. Since no restrictions are placed on price
diﬀerentials, we are in the position to examine their dynamic behavior in response to ﬁscal shocks.
Table 1: Identiﬁcation Restrictions
Corr(G,Y) Corr (T,Y) Corr (G, Def) Corr(T, Def) Corr(G,T)
Gs h o c k s > 0 > 0 > 0
BB shocks < 0= 0 = 1
Ts h o c k s < 0 < 0= 0
Since our approach to identiﬁcation diﬀers from the one typically used in the literature, it is
useful to highlight major diﬀerences and the advantages of our strategy. The existing literature
typically uses case study approaches, extraneous information or zero restrictions on the contempo-
raneous covariance matrix of VAR residuals to disentangle ﬁscal shocks from reduced form innova-
tions. Case studies (see Ramey and Shapiro (1998) or Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2002)) are
powerful way to study ﬁscal policy whenever one can make sure that the ﬁscal change is truly ex-
ogenous. As argued in Perotti (2002), such an assumption is problematic in at least two of the three
typically studied episodes (Korean War, Vietnam war, Reagan buildup). Relative to standard iden-
tiﬁcation approaches, our restrictions are theory based, while those employed in the literature are,
to a large extent, conventional and hard to justify with low frequency data. For example, assuming
that tax revenues do not respond to expenditure shocks within a period - an assumption used in the
literature to disentangle revenue and tax shocks - is problematic with annual data. Similarly, the
restrictions needed to identify expenditure shocks in quarterly data - e.g. that it takes more than
a quarter for government spending to respond to unexpected output movements (Blanchard and
Perotti (2002)) - are unappealing in annual data because of the presence of automatic stabilizers.
Since our methodology does not make use of zero restrictions, both the endogeneity which plagues
exercises where delay restrictions are used and the inherent underidentiﬁcation which results from
the general equilibrium nature of ﬁscal shocks are resolved.
To recover shocks with the required characteristics we use the methodology of Canova and
De Nicoló (2002). The approach starts from the eigenvalue-eigenvector orthogonalization of the
variance covariance matrix of VAR residuals and proceeds examining the responses of the en-
dogenous variables to each of the orthogonalized shocks. If we are unable to simultaneously
ﬁnd revenue and expenditure shocks producing the required comovements in the variables, the
output to such an extent that the initial cut in revenue is more than compensated by the larger tax base over which the
lower tax applies. Consequently, deﬁcits may be left unchanged or even decrease. Shocks with these characteristics
appear to be absent from both the data sets we examine.4 COMBINING THE INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT UNITS 10
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition is rotated by an orthonormal matrix P(θ),w h e r eθ measures
the angle of rotation, and the comovements in response to the new set of shocks examined. This
search process continues, varying θ in the range (0,π) and the columns of P(θ) which are rotated.
Many P(θ) can in principle produce the pattern we look for. The standard errors attached to point
estimates not only reﬂect uncertainty surrounding reduced form parameter estimates but also how
individual responses vary with these θ’s and P’s. Since the methodology allows us to thoroughly
search the space of identiﬁcation, one can examine whether the restrictions imposed are meaningful
or vacuous. Appendix B summarizes the algorithm used in the search.
4 Combining the information from diﬀerent units
Since both data sets are short, structural responses are likely to be imprecisely estimated. One
way to improve their quality is to construct an estimate which eﬃciently combines unit speciﬁca n d
cross sectional information. In addition, if some extra-sample information is available, one could
combine the two types of information to construct ”improved” estimates of the dynamics of interest.
We use both ideas in this paper. For the US we use cross unit information to construct a posterior
estimator of the structural price diﬀerential responses which endogenously weights unit speciﬁc
and average cross sectional information with their relative precision. This estimator collapses to a
standard OLS estimator, unit by unit, when there is no information in the cross section, and to
a pooled estimator when the cross sectional information dominates. On the other hand, we use
the posterior distribution for US responses to ”calibrate” the prior for structural price diﬀerential
responses in the EMU. Posterior price diﬀerential responses will then contain this prior information
and the unit speciﬁc information, weighted by their relative precision.
Let the ﬁve variable VAR(p) for each unit i =1 ,...N b ew r i t t e ni nac o m p a n i o nf o r mZit =
AiZit−1 + BiWt + Uit,w h e r eWt includes all exogenous variables, Zt is a 5p × 1 vector containing,
stacked, the p lags of each of the variables of the model, Ai is 5p × 5p and Uit ∼ (0,Σi).L e tt h e
structural moving average (MA) representation for the system be
















iPi(θ),E it = Pi(θ)0DiUit,s o m ePi(θ) with Pi(θ)Pi(θ)0 = I and D0
iDi = Σ−1
i .L e tαi
be a 25p2(J +1)×1 vector, each i containing, stacked, the coeﬃcients C
j
i for horizons ranging from
0 to J ≤ t − 1. W ea s s u m et h a tαi are related across i according to the following unit invariant4 COMBINING THE INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT UNITS 11
speciﬁcation:
αi = µ + vi vi ∼ N(0,τ) (2)
where µ represents the vector of (cross sectional) average structural MA coeﬃcients and τ its
dispersion. Our interest is in producing the posterior of a subset of the µ, the average price
diﬀerential responses to shocks, and of a subset of the αi, the unit speciﬁcp r i c ed i ﬀerential response
to shocks, in describing their features and in highlighting cross sectional diﬀerences.
For both monetary unions we assume that Uit are normally distributed and that Σui has an
inverted Wishart distribution with scale S and ν degrees of freedom. For US states we assume
ad i ﬀuse prior on µ, so that there is little information about the location of the structural MA
coeﬃcients for each unit, treat τ as ﬁxed and set it equal to τj = 0.2
j ,j =0 ,1,...,J,w h i c h
allows for considerable diﬀerence in individual units structural responses for the initial periods.
For EMU countries we assume that the a-priori distribution of µ is proportional to the posterior
distribution obtained for US states and set τj = 0.2
j ,j=0 ,1,...,J. Since the two data sets come
at diﬀerent frequencies, we take the prior mean for µ in EMU countries at the quarterly frequency
to be one-fourth of the US posterior mean for µ at the annual frequency and the prior quarterly
standard deviation of µ to be a half of the annual US posterior standard deviation of µ.T h e s e
two assumptions imply that the annual prior for the vector of average structural response in the
EMU is centered around the annual posterior mean of the average US structural responses but has
a larger variance.
The MA representation (1), the prior structure (2) and the assumptions made imply that, in
both cases, the joint posterior distribution for (αi,µ,Σui) has a Normal-Wishart structure. In
particular, (αi|µ,τ,Σui,Z), ∼ N(˜ αi, ˜ Vα),w h e r e˜ αi = ˜ Vαi(ˆ V −1
αi ˆ αi +τ−1µ) and ˜ Vα =(ˆ V −1
αi +τ−1)−1;
ˆ αi is the unit speciﬁcO L Se s t i m a t o ro fαi and ˆ Vαi its covariance matrix. Hence, ˜ αi is a weighted
average of the prior mean µ a n dt h eO L Se s t i m a t eo fˆ αi with weights given by the inverse of their
variances (precision). For US states (µ|τ,Σui,Z) ∼ N(˜ µ, ˜ Vµ) where ˜ µ = ˜ Vµ(
PN
i (ˆ Vαi +τ)−1ˆ αi) and
˜ Vµ =
PN
i (ˆ Vαi + τ)−1. Therefore, the posterior mean of µ is a weighted average of OLS estimates
with weights given by precision of the estimates. For EMU countries the posterior distribution for
µ has mean equal to ˜ µ = ˜ Vµ(σ−1
µ ¯ µ+
PN
i (ˆ Vαi +τ)−1ˆ αi) and variance ˜ Vµ =( σµ)−1+
PN
i (ˆ Vαi +τ)−1
where ¯ µ and σµ are the moments of the prior distribution of µ. Finally, (Σui|τ, Z), ∼ IW(S +
(XiX0
i,T+ν) where Xi is obtained stacking the T observations for Xit and IW stands for inverted
Wishart.
Note that since the posterior distributions of components of µ and αi are normal, the posterior5T H E R E S U L T S 12
means (˜ µ, ˜ αi) can be used as point estimates and the posterior 68% range as a measure of the
uncertainty surrounding structural price diﬀerential responses. Finally, since we simultaneously
identify revenue and expenditure shocks and since the identiﬁed shocks are orthogonal both among
themselves and to the block of non-identiﬁed disturbances by construction, standard summary
statistics (e.g. variance decomposition) can be directly computed and interpreted from posterior
estimates and the identiﬁed shocks.
5T h e R e s u l t s
5.1 Benchmarking the shocks
The identiﬁcation of structural shocks was partially successful. While in most US states and EMU
countries we were able to obtain G and T shocks, we managed to recover balance budget shocks
only in a few US states. Two facts may account for our failure: ﬁrst, several US states use funds
external to the yearly budget (e.g. stabilization funds) to smooth out those revenue ﬂuctuations
that would otherwise require changes in expenditure to maintain a balance budget; second, EMU
data is short and Maastricht restrictions were not binding for most of the sample.
For the US, we identify G shocks in 36 states, BB shocks in 12 states and T shocks in 31 states
while for the EMU we identify G shocks in 8 countries and T shocks in 5 countries. Since our
methodology is novel, it is important to make sure that the shocks we recover have reasonable
features. Since the literature concentrates on output multipliers and since numerous estimates in
response to tax and expenditure shocks are available for both the US and the major EMU countries,
we examine the reasonableness of our estimates using this metric. Output multipliers are computed
here as the ratio of the output response to the ﬁs c a ls h o c ks c a l e db yt h eﬁscal variable as percentage
of GDP, as in Mountford and Uhlig (2002). Since yearly multipliers are typically reported we focus
on instantaneous multipliers when discussing US data, while we cumulate the eﬀect to the yearly
frequency when discussing EMU data. Given the size and the shape of the responses, cumulating
the eﬀect say, to 4 years, would change little in the qualitative features of the results we present.
In the US two-third of the G shocks produce output multipliers above one, the median value
equals 1.40 and the interquartile range is [0.98, 2.54]. The 11 states whose output multiplier is
less than one are typically small (e.g. New Hampshire and Maine) or located in the Midwest
(e.g. Kansas or Illinois). Output multipliers are smaller following T shocks suggesting that deﬁcit
ﬁnanced expenditure shocks crowd out either consumption or investment less than deﬁcit ﬁnanced5T H E R E S U L T S 13
tax cuts. In fact, there are 17 states for which multipliers are less than one; the median value is 0.72
and the interquartile range is [0.43, 3.00]. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) using aggregate quarterly
US data, more standard VAR techniques and a diﬀerent deﬁnition, ﬁnd yearly multipliers smaller
than our median values, but have revenue multipliers which are almost twice as large as expenditure
multipliers. One reason for the smaller relative size of our revenue multipliers is the fact that local
taxes are only a small percentage of the total tax burden of the resident of a US state. Therefore,
their multiplicative eﬀects are likely to be smaller. For comparison, we have used our technique
on yearly aggregated US data and found that the yearly output multipliers to G and T shocks
are, respectively, 0.55 and 0.86, roughly the same as Blanchard and Perotti. On the other hand,
traditional multi-equation models, see e.g. Bryant et. al. (1993) or Daalgard et. al.(2001), appear
to produce output multipliers in response to G shocks which range from 0.9 to 2.0, depending
on the assumed monetary policy stance, numbers which square well with our interquartile range
estimate for G shocks.
Table 2: Yearly Output and Employment Multipliers
Output Employment
G shocks BB shocks T shocks G shocks BB shocks T shocks
US states
Median 1.40 (TX) -3.78 (NJ) 0.72 (CT) 0.03 (OR) -0.15 (WA) 0.05 (ME)
Min 0.26 (NH) -34.69 (KS) 0.001 (CO)-0.11 (ND) -0.39 (UT) -0.08 (MI)
Max 23.60 (NM) -0.10 (PA) 11.10 (TN) 0.28 (WV) 0.17 (NJ) 0.27 (WA)
25% 0.98 (AZ) -14.44 (UT) 0.43 (NB) 0.02 (MI) -0.30 (SC) 0.01 (IN)
75% 2.54 (NC) -1.50 (MT) 3.00 (NV) 0.08 (SD0 0.01 (PA) 0.06 (GA)
EMU countries
Median 0.79(IR) 0.60 (ES) -0.19 (ES) 0.08 (ES)
Min 0.25 (GE) 0.13 (GE) -1.73 (BE) -0.08 (FR)
Max 6.30 (BE) 9.20 (IR) 4.89 (FI) 1.06 (IT)
Interestingly, labor productivity instantaneously increases in 21 states following G shocks and
in 26 states following T shocks. In competitive labor markets this increase in productivity will be
translated in increases in real wages. Since production costs are likely to be higher, and since the
increase is typically larger for tax shocks, the production costs channel may also be a reason for
the small output multipliers produced by revenue shocks.
The output multipliers generated by a balance budget shocks are typically large. In fact, in
10 of the 12 cases the multiplier exceeds -1.0, in six it exceeds -5.0 and the median value is -3.78.
These numbers are comparable to those produced by Baxter and King (1993) in a RBC model
where labor supply is elastic: their estimate, using calibrated parameters, is -2.5.5T H E R E S U L T S 14
In the EMU, output multipliers are larger than one in 3 cases for G shocks (with median annual
response equal to 0.79) and in 3 cases for T shocks (with median annual response 0.60). These
numbers are smaller than those that Perotti (2002) reports for 5 OECD countries using diﬀerent
identiﬁcation strategies, a diﬀerent deﬁnition and a much larger sample size, but comparable to
those presented by Roeger and in’t Veld (2002), and by Hunt and Laxton (2002), who use traditional
structural models for Italy, France and Germany, and by Hernadez de Cos et. al. (2003), who used
a variety of Euro area Central Bank’s models and the Area wide model of the ECB - the range of
yearly output multipliers to G shocks is between 0.47 and 1.37.
In general, three features of EMU multipliers to ﬁscal shocks need to be emphasized. When
compared with US states, output multipliers in response to tax shocks are somewhat larger, re-
ﬂecting the relative importance of revenues in total GDP. Clear exceptions are the Netherlands and
Germany where multipliers are small. Second, expenditure shocks produce employment multipliers
which are smaller, in general, in the EMU. Hence, expenditure increases are a much more powerful
employment lever in US states than EMU nations. Third, expenditure shocks increase productivity
in all EMU countries but Finland, and the average size of the increase is larger than in US states.
We conjecture that diﬀerent labor market institutions may account for the relative size of output
and productivity multipliers in the two unions.
As a further check on the reasonableness of our approach we have examined whether our US
ﬁscal shocks contain some endogenous component by regressing them on a few local, regional and
aggregate indicators (local unemployment, regional GDP and aggregate M1). Overall, our ﬁscal
shocks do not appear to proxy for omitted variables.
5.2 Average Eﬀects
In all the ﬁgures we present below, we normalize the expenditure impulse to be positive and of
unitary size and the revenue impulse to be negative and of unitary size.
5.2.1 The United States
Figure 1 reports the cross sectional average response of price diﬀerentials (column 1), of employment
diﬀerentials (column 2), and of output diﬀerentials (column 3) to the three types of disturbances.








































































Figure 1: Average responses in the US
On average, G and T disturbances signiﬁcantly increase price diﬀerentials. Recall that our
identiﬁcation requires these shocks to increase output and deﬁcits. Standard textbook analysis
suggests that following the ﬁscal expansion the local demand curve moves to the right. Whenever5T H E R E S U L T S 16
local demand is biased toward locally produced goods, which appears to be the case on average,
given the responses of relative employment, local prices increase more than union wide prices.
A BB type disturbance signiﬁcantly decreases price diﬀerentials on average. Such a pattern
can be easily interpreted recalling the identiﬁcation restrictions. An expenditure increase, ﬁnanced
by distortionary taxation, is in fact assumed to have contractionary eﬀects on output. Therefore,
although the increase in government spending may shift local demand to the right, the increase in
distortionary taxation needed to maintain a balanced budget, shifts the same curve to the left. As
a result, both relative output and relative employment fall and price diﬀerentials decrease.
Note that, while price diﬀerential responses are contemporaneously signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for BB and T shocks, it takes about a year for G shocks to exercise a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Furthermore, while for the ﬁrst two shocks signiﬁcant price diﬀerentials responses are no-
ticeable for up to 2-3 years, in the latter case, responses become insigniﬁcant again only after 6
years. Hence, G shocks take time on average to spill onto prices but their eﬀect is more persistent.
One may be tempted to interpret this evidence as indicating that price stickiness diﬀers in response
to diﬀerent shocks. This is incorrect: since standard errors are relatively large even in the initial
period, it is impossible to identify the timing of the peak response with absolute precision.
The magnitude of the responses diﬀers across types of shocks. In fact, the mean of the posterior
price diﬀerential response is -0.18 percentage points in the case of BB shocks; 0.15 in the case of
T shocks and a mere 0.025 percent in the case of G shocks. This ordering of magnitudes is in line
with the ordering of relative output and relative employment responses to the three shocks and
with the ﬁndings of Mountford and Uhlig (2002) for aggregate data.
5.2.2 The EMU
Price diﬀerential responses for the EMU are also in line with theoretical expectations: both G and
T disturbances increase, on average, price diﬀerentials. The eﬀect lasts longer for G shocks (5
quarters) than for T shocks (1 quarter) and, contrary to what we have documented for the US,
responses peak instantaneously in both cases.
The magnitude of the mean of the posterior response of price diﬀerentials to G disturbances
is 0.18 and to T shocks is about 0.12. Therefore, contrary to what we have found in US states,
expenditure shocks have larger eﬀects on price diﬀerential than revenue shocks. This diﬀerence has
to do with the size of government consumption expenditure to output ratio, which is more than















































Figure 2: Average Responses in EMU
Recall that estimates of structural responses in the EMU are obtained under the assumption
that, a-priori, the distribution of the vector of average structural responses, is similar to the posterior
distribution of average responses of US states. Although qualitatively similar, price diﬀerential
responses are quantitatively diﬀerent in the two areas. Hence, despite the short sample, there is
information in the data to pull the posterior away from the prior.
To summarize, ﬁscal disturbances which expand output and deﬁcit increase price diﬀerentials
(either instantaneously or with a lag) while disturbances which contract output and leave deﬁcit
unchanged decrease price diﬀerentials. The size and the timing of the eﬀects vary with the type of
disturbances and the monetary union. In the US balance budget disturbances are the most eﬀective
in altering price diﬀerentials on average; expenditure shocks impart the most persistent responses
and revenue shocks the most similar dynamics across states. In the EMU, the pattern induced by5T H E R E S U L T S 18
expenditure and revenue shocks is similar.
5.3 Individual unit pattern
While average price diﬀerential responses are in line with theoretical expectations and the pre-
dictions of existing large scale macro models (see Hernandez de Cos, et. al. (2003)), there are
important heterogeneities in the signs, the shapes and the magnitude of the responses of individual
units in both monetary unions.
Since the reader may not be aware of the consequences that our stochastic pooling procedure
has on structural responses for each unit, we brieﬂyd i s c u s st h ed i ﬀerences obtained using single
unit and cross sectional information. In Figure 3 we present estimates of price diﬀerential responses
in two states for each of the three shocks: the top row reports cases where diﬀerences are visible,
the bottom row cases where they are not.
 






















































Figure 3: OLS and Posterior estimates
Overall, estimates diﬀer primarily in the medium-long run. For example, the responses of price
diﬀerentials in West Virginia (to a G shock), Maryland (to a BB shock) and Connecticut (to a
T shock) tend to be highly persistent and the latter two are still far away dying out 10 years
after the shocks when individual state data is used (dotted line). Such a pattern disappears, or5T H E R E S U L T S 19
is considerably reduced, when cross sectional information is taken into account (straight line). In
general, the use of cross sectional information does not change either the shape or the timing of
the structural responses but aﬀects the persistence of price diﬀerential dynamics.
5.3.1 US States
Price diﬀerential responses in US states are somewhat heterogenous 4. For example, in 6 out of 36
cases the peak response to G shocks is instantaneous while in the remaining 29 a hump response is
obtained (with the peak occurring between 2 and 5 years). In addition, in 5 states the response is
never signiﬁcant, while in 7 is signiﬁcant for up to 5 years. For those 31 states displaying signiﬁcant
price diﬀerential responses for at least one period, the absolute size of the maximum response
varies from -0.09 to 0.61 (with the median around zero). For T shocks the pattern is similar. Price
diﬀerential responses have a hump in 13 of the 31 cases and the peak response also varies between 2
and 5 years. There are 8 states for which responses are signiﬁcant only for one year and 5 for which
responses are signiﬁcant for at least 5 years; and the absolute size of maximum response varies from
- 0 . 6 0t o0 . 8 6 .F o rB Bs h o c k s ,p r i c ed i ﬀerential responses have a hump in 10 cases, the location of
the hump varies from one to six years and the mean response turns positive at horizons varying
from one to ﬁve years. Responses die out after one year in six states while in West Virginia price
diﬀerential responses are signiﬁcant up to 5 years after the shock. Here, the size of the hump varies
from 0.05 to 0.20 and the median is around 0.12. Despite these quantitative diﬀerence, several
common qualitative features remain: price diﬀerential responses to BB shocks are typically larger
than those to T or G shocks; G shocks produce lagged and more persistent responses than T shocks.
Table 3: Price Diﬀerential responses
US states EMU countries
G shocks BB shocks T shocks Gs h o c k s Ts h o c k s
Median0.001 (NC) -0.18 (MD) 0.05 (WI) 0.01 (IT) 0.10 (ES)
Min -0.09 (AZ) -0.58 (NJ) -0.60(ME)-0.09 (GE)0.06 (GE)
Max 0.61 (WV) -0.02 (MT) 0.86 (TN) 3.66 (BE) 0.28 (IT)
25% -0.03 (SD) -0.26 (MS) -0.01(IA)
75% 0.03 (AL) -0.04 (VW) 0.25 (DE)
The most interesting cross state diﬀerence in price diﬀerential dynamics concerns the sign of
the responses to G and T shocks (see table 3). In fact, in about 35 percent of the states price diﬀer-
ential responses to G shocks are instantaneously negative while T shocks produce instantaneously
4Plots of the posterior distribution of price diﬀerential responses for each US state and each EMU country to the
shocks together with state informations are contained in a technical appendix available on request.5T H E R E S U L T S 20
negative price diﬀerential responses in about 25 percent of the states. There are asymmetries in the
magnitude of price diﬀerential responses of the two groups: positive responses are typically larger
than negative ones but some large negative price diﬀerential movements are present, e.g. in Maine.
Interestingly, only in 13 states expenditure increases and revenue cuts move price diﬀerentials in
the same direction- increases occur in 12 states and decreases in one - and in these states an un-
expected reduction in tax revenues produces larger price diﬀerential responses than an unexpected
expenditure increase.
Table 4: Variance Decomposition
US states EMU countries
10 year horizon 8 quarters horizon
MeanMedianInterquartile rangeMeanMedian Min-Max
G Shocks 0.14 0.11 [0.05, 0.17] 0.21 0.18 [0.03, 0.47]
BB Shocks 0.23 0.21 [0.10, 0.30]
T Shocks 0.19 0.14 [0.05, 0.20] 0.15 0.14 [0.03, 0.34]
Central Banks worrying about regional inﬂation diﬀerentials and their potential eﬀects on price
stability may be interested in knowing how important are the shocks we have identiﬁed in quanti-
tatively explaining price diﬀerential variability. Table 4 presents this information at the 10 years
horizon: we report the mean, the median and the interquartile range across US states (min-max
for EMU) of the price diﬀerential movements explained by the three types of shocks. On average,
expenditure shocks explain 14 percent, balance budget shocks 23 percent and revenue shocks about
19 percent of price diﬀerential variability. For some states the percentage of price diﬀerential vari-
ability explained is large. In fact, expenditure disturbances in New Mexico and Texas and revenue
disturbances in New Hampshire and Tennessee account for 40 percent or more of the variability of
local to union wide prices. These large numbers do not appear to be due the result of measurement
errors - using implicit price deﬂator data produced the same result - and could be related to the
fact the composition of local output is tilted toward one sector.
Hence, ﬁscal disturbance can signiﬁcantly aﬀect price diﬀerential variability. In the majority
of the cases the contribution is modest, but there are instances where ﬁscal disturbances are a
powerful lever for price diﬀerential ﬂuctuations.
5.3.2 EMU Countries
Price diﬀerential responses to G shocks are heterogeneous also in the EMU. For example, in three
countries responses peak instantaneously and in ﬁve a hump with location varying from 1 to 55T H E R E S U L T S 21
quarters occurs; responses are signiﬁcant for one quarter in Austria and last up to 8 quarters in
Italy; the maximum size of the responses varies from -0.09 (Germany) to 3.61 in Belgium. Response
to revenue shocks are more similar in shape (they all peak instantaneously) and persistence (they
die out after two quarters) but the magnitude of the peak response varies from 0.06 (Germany) to
0.28 (Italy). Also in the EMU there are three countries where expansionary expenditure shocks
decrease price diﬀerentials. The eﬀect is typically temporary: in Germany it lasts two periods, in
Ireland and Spain only one period.
It is worth relating price diﬀerential responses to one particular episode which has attracted
attention in the policy circles. To induce foreign investments into the country, the Irish government
reduced taxes on capital income in the third quarter of 1999 and this led to a signiﬁcant increase in
output in 2000 and the ﬁrst half of 2001. In February 2001 the European Council issued a warning
(Action against Ireland, Euro Oﬃcial Journal, 9/3/2001, C077, pp.7) calling Irish authorities to
restraint their attempts to reduce the cyclically adjusted surplus. In particular, the Council was
concerned with the eﬀects that such policy had on inﬂation diﬀerential. Our investigation suggests
that such a worry was probably excessive. In fact, the maximum price diﬀerential response is
”only” 0.25 and occurs in conjuction with a huge expansionary output eﬀect (instantaneous output
response is around 7.0). Interestingly, such a number is much larger than the magnitude of price
diﬀerential responses produced in Germany (maximum about 0.07) or France (maximum 0.09), two
countries close to be violating the Growth and Stability Pact limits in the sample.
The percentage of price diﬀerential variability explained by ﬁscal disturbances in EMU countries
is qualitatively similar to what we have found for US states. Expenditure shocks account on average
for 21 percent and revenue shocks for 14 percent of price diﬀerential variability. Heterogeneities are
clearly noticeable here: G shocks explain more than 40 percent of the variability of price diﬀerentials
in Ireland and Finland and roughly zero in Germany or Spain, while tax shocks explain about 34
percent of price diﬀerential variability in Spain and negligible amounts in Belgium, France and
Germany. Clearly, one should be careful with these estimates: the sample includes almost a full
economic cycle but it may not be representative of the typical conditions present in the EMU.
5.4 Why are price diﬀerential responses negative?
As we have seen, there are a number of US states and three EMU countries where unexpected
expansionary ﬁscal disturbances bring about a signiﬁcant and at times persistent reduction in local
to union wide prices. These responses are surprising from the point of view of economic theory, both5T H E R E S U L T S 22
of Keynesian and neoclassical orientations, because output increases in response to these shocks.
This, for example, excludes explanations based on extreme crowding out of other components
of aggregate demand or expectational eﬀects of the type emphasized by e.g., Giavazzi, Jappelli
and Pagano (2000), since in these episodes local to union wide outputs and prices move in the
same direction. Similarly, explanations based on the assumption that ﬁscal policy may anticipate
local recessions and therefore spuriously produce negative price diﬀerentials are excluded by our
identiﬁcation scheme which requires output and expenditure to move in the same direction. Note
also that when estimating individual eﬀects, we have not restricted the sum of price diﬀerential
responses to be zero. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that responses will be positive in some
units and negative in others. While the pattern is somewhat puzzling, it is by no means uncommon.
In fact, when using aggregate US data and diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies, Mountford and Uhlig
(2002), CEPS (2002) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) all ﬁnd that prices decline after either
a revenue cut or an expenditure increase, and Perotti (2002) ﬁnds that such an eﬀect occurs also
in other OECD countries, unless extraneous information is used to pin down the price elasticity of
spending disturbances.
To characterize units with a perverse pattern, we have looked at a number of indicators. We
examined whether the geographical position of a unit, its economic size (measured by the relative
population size or by the relative GDP size), the size of its local government (measured by the
average expenditure to GDP or average deﬁcit to average union wide deﬁcit), the magnitude of the
government debt (measured by the average debt to GDP) and the state of government ﬁnances
(measured by the average Moody rating over the period), the composition of output and, for US
states, the index of strictness of balance budget requirements (measured by the ACIR index), the
political color of the governors and of the state parliaments and the average price of land could
be used to characterize states where expansionary ﬁscal shocks induce negative price diﬀerential
responses. In general, none of these variables seem to matter. For example, take the US and
expenditure shocks. Among, the states with negative price responses, we have both small and large
states (e.g. Vermont and Mississippi vs. Michigan or New York); states where the expenditure to
GDP ratio is both small and large relative to the average (Illinois vs. Maine); states with good
and relative bad credit ratings or high and low average level of debt (e.g. Vermont vs. Arizona);
states where the agricultural sector is large and small (e.g. Kansas vs. Michigan); states which
were, on average, republican and democrat (e.g. Nevada vs. Vermont); and states where land
prices were higher or lower than average (e.g. New York and Wisconsin). While surprising at ﬁrst,5T H E R E S U L T S 23
this outcome is reasonable: since these indicators capture much longer types of trends, they do not
aﬀect the dynamics we care about.
Theoretically, we can think of two possible reasons for why ﬁscal expansions may induce negative
price diﬀerential responses. The ﬁrst has to do with spillover eﬀects: if increases in local demand
are spread over a number of units and if multiplier eﬀects pile up, union-wide demand may increase
more than local demand and this may make union-wide prices respond more strongly than local
prices to unexpected expansionary local ﬁscal shocks. The second has to do with movements in the
local aggregate supply curve: expansionary ﬁscal shocks may in fact shift such a curve to the right
as agents optimally readjust their labor supply and investment decisions. If the magnitude of the
movements are right, price diﬀerentials may decline.
The composition of tax revenues can also account for the negative responses of price diﬀerentials
to revenue shocks. In fact, while cuts in income or capital taxations may induce labor (and capital)
supply eﬀects in some scenarios, these eﬀects are likely to be small in the case of indirect taxes.
Hence, distinguishing between various types of revenues cuts could be important, especially because
among US states with negative price diﬀerential responses are a few where the fraction of state
government activities ﬁnanced through state income and corporate taxes is higher than average
(see table 5).
Table 5: Tax Decomposition, Selected US states
Sales TaxIncome TaxCorporate Tax
AR 0.60 0.32 0.08
CO 0.54 0.40 0.06
IA 0.55 0.38 0.07
IN 0.63 0.32 0.05
LA 0.73 0.17 0.10
ME 0.67 0.27 0.06
OH 0.67 0.26 0.07
SD 0.96 0.00 0.04
US Average 0.65 0.27 0.08
Spillover eﬀects may occur for many reasons. For example, it could be that the size of the state
is large and the multiplicative eﬀects generated in the region are of an order of magnitude larger
than those generated locally or that the diﬀerence between local GDP and local GNP is large.
We have seen that size does not matter; the GNP/GDP diﬀerence is unavailable for US states.
Casual empiricism suggests that this diﬀerence is larger for North Eastern and Eastern states than
for Midwest or Western states, but, again, location does not seem to matter. In the EMU the5T H E R E S U L T S 24
GNP/GDP diﬀerential is important for Ireland - on average it was 14% over the period but it
is hardly a factor for Spain or Germany, the other two countries with negative price diﬀerential
responses. Another possibility is that expansionary ﬁscal policy may increase the demand of non-
locally produced goods. This could occur, for example, when the industrial structure of a unit has
particular features (e.g. value added is skewed toward a particular activity), when the productive
structure is such that local output is produced with intermediate inputs coming from neighboring
units or when home bias in consumption is small. To eﬀectively examine this hypothesis one
needs intrastate and intracountry trade data or the industrial composition of value added in each
state (nation). We have managed to ﬁnd bilateral trade data for EMU countries and found some
evidence that trade eﬀects are important. However, the size of trade spillovers, as measured by the
instantaneous response of import, is modest, similar to the average EMU eﬀect for Germany and
Spain (0.02), and negligible for Ireland.
Lacking bilateral trade data for US states, we check for spillover eﬀects indirectly examining
price diﬀerential for BLS regions - our working assumption being that spillovers are localized within
BLS geographical regions. Therefore, if the hypothesis is correct, regional prices should increase in
response to expansionary local ﬁscal shocks or, at the very least, decrease less.
The results are somewhat supportive of the spillover hypothesis. In 5 of the 16 states where
local expenditure shocks reduced local to union wide prices, regional to union wide prices increase
and in 4 of the 7 states where local revenue shocks reduced local to union wide prices, regional
to union wide prices increase (or decline less than local prices). We present a few typical cases
in ﬁgure 4. In Arizona and Mississippi, relative prices persistently fall following a G shock, while
BLS regional relative prices are signiﬁcantly increased for about two years. In Arkansas revenue
cuts have an initially strong negative impact on local relative prices but regional prices move up
signiﬁcantly. For Maine the eﬀect on New England price diﬀerential is qualitatively similar to the
one for the state but, quantitatively, the eﬀect is considerably muted.
Dynamic general equilibrium models tell us that changes in the ﬁscal stance may have important
repercussions on the aggregate supply of the economy. First, there is a direct eﬀect due, for example,
to the fact that higher spending on infrastructure increases the productivity of factors of production
and this, in turns, shifts the aggregate supply. If relative movements in the aggregate demand and
the aggregate supply are ”right”, it is possible that local to union wide prices to countercyclically
respond to local ﬁscal shocks. The second eﬀect is indirect: an increase in government spending
might induce an increase in labor supply which, in turns, shifts the aggregate supply curve to the5T H E R E S U L T S 25
right. This could happen, for example, if agents expect the increase in government spending to be
ﬁnanced by future taxation; since agents would be induced to work harder in the current period























































Figure 4: Local Spillover Eﬀects
While intuitively plausible, calibrated analyses of general equilibrium models (e.g. King and
Baxter (1993)) have hard time to make this eﬀect non-negligible. In general, if the latter channel
is operative, units with falling price diﬀerentials should display employment and output responses
which are signiﬁcantly larger than those of units with increasing price diﬀerentials.
The evidence on these issues is mixed: in only a few of the US states with negative price
diﬀerential responses, the output eﬀect is larger than the average (in 3 out of 16 for both expenditure
shocks and 2 out of 7 for revenue shocks). Employment responses are slightly more in line with
the prediction of theory in the case of expenditure shocks (5 out of 16) but, in general, the eﬀect
is minor. In the EMU the output eﬀect for Spain is larger than the average, the Irish one becomes
larger after a quarter, while the one for Germany is small. Employment eﬀects are negligible in
Germany and negative in Ireland and Spain.5T H E R E S U L T S 26
The composition of tax revenues can also provide important information about local aggregate
supply movements. If a revenue cut is engineered via reduction of income taxation, price diﬀerentials
may fall when the substitution eﬀect is strong and dominates the income eﬀect on agents’ labor
supply. A decrease in income taxation in fact makes agents wealthier and, as a result, may reduce
their labor supply. On the other hand, it also increases the relative price of leisure and may
induce agents to work harder. If this second eﬀect dominates, the aggregate supply shifts to the
right and prices diﬀerentials may fall. If the cut in revenues is engineered via reduction of capital
taxes, the marginal product of capital increases, investments become more proﬁtable and therefore
consumption may fall. Therefore, cuts in capital taxation may also reduce prices diﬀerentials in
some scenario. It is however hard to conceive the existence of sizable supply eﬀects when revenue




































Figure 5: Price diﬀerential response to diﬀerent tax shocks
For EMU countries, the shortness of the sample and the lack of signiﬁcant independent variations
among tax revenue components impede any veriﬁcation of our conjecture. For US states, where the
sample is larger and the variations more signiﬁcant, we ﬁnd some support for the argument. In fact,
in 5 of the 7 states substituting sales tax revenues to total tax revenue increases price diﬀerential
while substituting income or capital tax revenues to total revenues leaves the sign of the responses
unchanged. To illustrate this fact, ﬁgure 5 presents responses in Arkansas and Colorado, when we
substitute income, capital or sales revenues for total revenues in the VAR. In both states sales tax
5Since sales taxes are included in the CPI one should expect to see relative price decrease as taxes decrease in the
very short run. However, this eﬀect should dissipate within a year.6 CONCLUSIONS 27
shocks increase price diﬀerentials while income/capital taxes decrease them.
It is important to stress that neither spillover nor labor supply eﬀects appear to matter for
states displaying positive price diﬀerentials responses. In fact, in only a couple of cases substituting
regional to state prices or changing the type of tax revenues turned price diﬀerential responses neg-
ative, albeit insigniﬁcant. Hence, both mechanisms appear to be important in producing negative
price diﬀerential responses.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper studied the relationship between local ﬁscal policy and price diﬀerentials in monetary
unions using a sample of 47 US states and 9 EMU countries. We identify ﬁscal shocks using
sign restrictions on the responses of output and deﬁcits generated by dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models of ﬁscal policy. We consider two types of expenditure shocks: those ﬁnanced by
bond creation, which produce positive comovements in local output and deﬁcits; and those ﬁnanced
by distorting taxation, which leave local deﬁcits unchanged and produce negative comovements in
local outputs, and one type of revenue shocks, i.e. tax cuts which increase local deﬁcit and output.
We construct estimates of the average and of the local price diﬀerential responses which reﬂect
local and cross sectional and/or a-priori information.
Our results suggest that ﬁscal policy is a modest but statistically signiﬁcant source of price
diﬀerentials. The magnitude of the eﬀects varies with the unit and the type of shocks but, on
average, ﬁscal disturbances explain between 14 and 23 percent of price diﬀerential ﬂuctuations in
both unions. Heterogeneities however do exist and there are states (countries) where more than
40% of the price diﬀerential variability is attributable to some ﬁscal shock. Interestingly, in Ireland
and Germany, two countries under EU scrutiny over the period because of their loose ﬁscal policy,
the variability explained by ﬁscal shocks is negligible.
On average, deﬁcit ﬁnanced expansionary ﬁscal shocks increase price diﬀerentials, while balance
budget shocks (expenditure increases ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation) decrease price diﬀeren-
tials. There are a number of US states and EMU countries where expansionary ﬁscal disturbances
lead to signiﬁcant decreases in local to union wide prices. Various intuitive explanation based on
geographical, political, economic and social indicators fail to explain these puzzling responses. We
investigate two explanations based on spillover and labor supply eﬀects and tentatively found both
mechanism promising in accounting for perverse price diﬀerential responses.
Our results have important policy implications. First, since local ﬁscal policy has a statistically6 CONCLUSIONS 28
large eﬀect in some states (countries), policymakers caring about regional price diﬀerentials may
ﬁnd in our work an empirical justiﬁcation for imposing limits to both the size and the variability
of local ﬁscal policy. Clearly, our results do not preclude the possibility that one may want to
constrain ﬁscal policy for other reasons (e.g. to enhance the credibility of monetary authorities
or to reduce the probability of debt monetization). Second, balance budget shocks have large
eﬀects on both local output and local prices. Therefore, our results also warn policymakers against
imposing too strict ﬁscal constraints which, to be maintained, may require dramatic adjustments
in the local economy. Third, diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments have diﬀerent eﬀects in the local economy.
Deﬁcit ﬁnanced expenditure shocks produce lagged but more persistent and revenue shocks larger
price diﬀerential responses. Hence, keeping tax smoothing motives aside, revenue cuts appear to be
an important stabilization instrument while expenditure changes could end up having undesirable
procyclical eﬀects, especially considering standard implementation lags. In addition, since surprise
declines in local income taxes exercise an important eﬀect on the aggregate supply of the local
economy, they may provide a useful channel to stabilize overheated economies. Fourth, while there
are similarities between the US and the EMU, there are also important quantitative diﬀerences.
Whether they are due to transitional dynamics, small samples or institutional diﬀerences we are
not able to tell, given the short experience of the EMU.
This paper is concerned with the somewhat narrow question of whether and to what extent local
ﬁscal policy has eﬀects on local prices. Hence, we did not address the important policy question
of whether local ﬁscal policy should be used to aﬀect local prices. This problem is examined in
Pappa (2003). There it is shown that local ﬁscal policy can be used to stabilize the local price
level in response to asymmetric shocks in a monetary union when the central monetary authority
is concerned only with union wide price stability and that this course of action optimally allocates
the available resources.6 CONCLUSIONS 29
Appendix A: Data sources and deﬁnitions
US data is annual from 1969 to 1995, real, seasonally adjusted, per capita data. U.S. Census
Bureau is the source unless it is otherwise indicated.
State Population: total state population in thousands.
Gross state product (in constant 1982 prices): obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) from 1977; before 1977 we used the series from Oved Yosha’s US State-Level Macroeconomic
Databank (www.tau.ac.il/yosha ).
State revenue:t o t a lr e v e n u e .
State expenditure: direct state expenditure - state capital outlays. Direct expenditure measures
all expenditures other than intergovernmental expenditures.
State debt: total debt outstanding at the end of the ﬁscal year.
State employment: total full and part time state employment (from BEA).
State Prices: state prices are from Del Negro (1998). The price level for state i is computed as:
Pit = wu
i Pu




it denotes the price level in rural areas of state i and it is taken from the Monthly Labor
Review data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (after 1978). Before 1978 it measures the ”cost of
living for intermediate level budget” and the same source is the same. wu
i measures the fraction of
population living in rural areas of state i and comes from the Statistical Abstract on the percentage
of rural population by state. Pu














it is the CPI in metropolitan area k, it is obtained from the ACCRA (American Chamber
of Commerce Realtors Association) and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics data on CPI for Urban
Consumers (CPI-U) and CPI by Regions and by Urban Population. ωk
i is the percentage of urban
population living in metropolitan area k which is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
site at the University of Virginia. PB
it is the CPI in other urban areas and it is taken from the
Monthly Labor Review data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. State CPI is normalized so that in
each year their population average coincides with the US CPI.
State GDP Deﬂators: computed from real and Nominal state GDP data
US aggregate data for real GDP, interests rate, CPI and oil prices come from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FREDII data bank. Data on federal expenditures, revenues, deﬁcits and
population come from the US Census.
EMU data is quarterly from 1997:1-2003:3, real, seasonally adjusted, and per capita. The
Eurostat National Accounts Main Indicator (NAMA_Q) is the main data source unless indicated.6 CONCLUSIONS 30
Population: total country population in thousands from the Quarterly Labor Force Statistics
of the OECD
Prices: harmonized consumer price index, base 1996, from the ECB.
Gross domestic product: in constant 1996 prices.
Total revenue: taxes less subsidies on production and imports.
Current expenditure: ﬁnal consumption expenditure, general government.
Employment: total employment in thousands from the IMF World Economic Outlook.
Union wide interest rate, union wide HICP prices, employment, GDP (base 1996) are from the
ECB databank and refer to EUROZONE12 (EUR-11 plus GR up to 31.12.2000 / EUR-12 from
1.1.2001)
Appendix B: Identifying shocks
The algorithm used to extract ﬁscal shocks is the following. Let Pi,i0(θ) be an orthonormal ma-
trix which rotate columns i and i0 of the covariance matrix the orthogonalized shocks, i,i0 =1 ,...,5.
Then:
(i) Draw θ ∼ U[0,π] and i,i0 ∼ U[1,5],i 6= i0,w h e r eU indicates a uniform distribution.
(ii) Draw αi ∼ N(˜ αi, ˜ Vα) where ˜ . indicate posterior estimates.
(iii) Compute responses to shocks. If restrictions are satisﬁed, keep the draws and the responses.
(iv) Order the retained responses, extract a measure of location and a 68% central conﬁdence set.7 REFERENCES 31
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